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Objective. To investigate the effects of local labor market conditions and the avail-
ability of employer-sponsored health insurance on exits from the Medicaid program.
Data Source. Data for this project come from a unique administrative database con-
taining a 2 percent sample of all cases on California’s Medicaid program in 1987 and a 2
percent sample of all new cases starting each year between 1987 and 1995.
Study Design. The results are estimated using a discrete duration model where the
monthly exit probability is a function of demographic characteristics, local labor market
variables, the probability of having employer-sponsored insurance, and fixed year and
county effects.
Principal Findings. Improvements in labor market opportunities (i.e., employment
growth, wage growth, and increases in the availability of employer-sponsored health
insurance) promote exits off the Medicaid program. A 2.5 percentage point increase in
the availability of employer-sponsored insurance leads to a 6 percent increase in the
probability that a completed spell lasts no more than 2 years. It would take a 2 per-
centage point decrease in unemployment rates or a 10 percent increase in average
quarterly earnings to yield an equivalent increase in the likelihood of exiting Medicaid
within 2 years. These effects are robust to the inclusion of county-level fixed effects and
time effects.
Conclusions. Medicaid expenditures and caseloads are sensitive to local economic
fluctuations and secular trends in the availability of health insurance. Continued de-
creases in employer-based health insurance coverage will greatly increase the demand
for public insurance coverage and the financial pressures on state governments.
Key Words. Medicaid, unemployment, health insurance, local labor markets
As eligibility for public health insurance expands, individuals may drop pri-
vate insurance coverage and switch to public insurance. This problem, known
as crowd-out, has been a key issue in debates regarding the expansion of
Medicaid to women and children living above 100 percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL) (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1997;
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Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen 2000; Long and Marquis 2002; Lo
Sasso and Buchmueller 2004). Rather than strictly reducing the number of
uninsured, in the presence of crowd-out, increases in Medicaid eligibility shift
the burden of health care coverage for the working-poor from employers to
federal and state governments.
In this paper, I consider the opposite effect——‘‘crowd-in.’’ Specifically, I
examine how changes in the availability of employer-provided health insur-
ance and local labor market conditions (i.e., unemployment rates, employ-
ment opportunities, and earnings expectations) influence exits from the
Medicaid program.
As the crowd-out literature shows, public health insurance and private
health insurance are good substitutes for at least some low-income consumers.
Thus, not only should changes in the structure of public health insurance affect
the take-up of private health insurance but the reverse will also be true. Ex-
ogenous declines in the availability of employer-sponsored coverage may
push people onto Medicaid, whereas expansions in private coverage may pull
people off the Medicaid program. As a result, Medicaid caseloads and ex-
penditures will be sensitive to changes in the availability of employer-spon-
sored insurance coverage and structural changes in the economy that affect the
rate of coverage through employer-sponsored plans (e.g., the movement of
jobs and workers from the manufacturing sector to the service sector, or from
unionized employers to small businesses). In other words, it is not just the
growth in jobs that will affect the dynamics of Medicaid participation but the
growth in jobs with health insurance.
Few articles have examined the dynamics of Medicaid participation and
none has modeled the relationship between the duration of Medicaid spells
and local labor market conditions (Cromwell et al. 1997; Berger and Black
1998; Short and Freedman 1998). Studies of participation in public assistance
programs have focused primarily on welfare cash assistance programs (e.g.,
temporary assistance for needy families [TANF] or the former aid for families
with dependent children [AFDC] program). As a result, we know little about
the duration of Medicaid spells in contrast to welfare spells.
Although Medicaid has always covered a much larger population than
welfare and Medicaid spells have never been completely contemporaneous
with welfare spells, welfare reforms enacted under the Personal Responsibility
Address correspondence to Krista M. Perreira, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Public
Policy, University of North Carolina, Abernethy Hall, CB#3435, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3435.
Effect of Private Health Insurance Markets on Medicaid 1763
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) further decoupled the
two programs (Kronebusch 2001). For these reasons, it is increasingly impor-
tant to have baseline data on Medicaid dynamics from which to analyze the
effects of welfare reforms. Moreover, data on the effects of local labor market
conditions and changes in private health insurance coverage on Medicaid are
essential for forecasting caseload and expenditure growth.
No studies have modeled the relationship between local labor market
conditions and the duration of Medicaid spells. But several studies on welfare
participation suggest the relationship could be significant (Moffitt 1992, 2003;
Bane and Ellwood 1994). Most importantly, research on the dynamics of
welfare participation suggests that the relationship between labor market
conditions and public assistance participation is best studied at a local, county
level rather than at a state level. State-level analyses of labor market effects on
public assistance participation have been inconclusive (O’Neil, Bassi, and
Wolf 1987; Blank and Ruggles 1996). However Hoynes (2000) and Fitzgerald
(1995) both found evidence that local labor market characteristics——measured
by county unemployment rates, employment growth, employment to pop-
ulation ratios, average quarterly earnings, and per capita retail sales——signif-
icantly influence exits off welfare. Studies of welfare dependency also
demonstrate that the availability of public and private health insurance af-
fects the dynamics of public assistance participation and entry into the labor
market (Blank 1989a; Ellwood and Adams 1990; Moffitt and Wolf 1992;
Yelowitz 1995).
In part, research on the dynamics of Medicaid participation has been
hindered by the lack of longitudinal data. In this analysis, I use a unique
database that merges monthly data on a large sample of Medicaid participants
in California with monthly data on county labor market characteristics over a
9-year period (1987–1995). No other data on public assistance participation
provide such extraordinary breadth and depth of information on Medicaid
participants. With these data, I estimate a discrete duration model where the
monthly exit probability is a function of demographic characteristics, Med-
icaid benefit characteristics, local labor market conditions, the availability of
employer-sponsored insurance, and fixed time and county effects.
BACKGROUND ON CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAID PROGRAM
California’s Medicaid program——called Medi-Cal——is the largest state insur-
ance program in the United States (U.S. House of Representatives 2004).
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Nationally, Medicaid cost $210 billion and covered an average of 51 million
persons in 2002 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a). In California, Medi-Cal
cost over $27.2 billion and covered approximately 8 million persons (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2004b).
Although all recipients of Medi-Cal are generally entitled to the same
medical care services, the eligibility requirements for their participation differ
substantially. This analysis includes persons from six eligibility groups: (1)
AFDC-related single-parent families, (2) AFDC-unemployed parent (UP) two-
parent families, (3) the Medically Needy (MN), (4) transitional/continuing
Medi-Cal families, (5) Edward-Meyers recipients, and (6) the medically in-
digent (MI). These six groups comprise approximately 70 percent of all Medi-
Cal recipients.
The largest group of recipients——single-parents with children——qualifies
for Medi-Cal via their eligibility for welfare-related cash assistance. In 1987,
these parents were required to have gross incomes below 150 percent of the
FPL. By 1995, the gross income limit in California had declined to 133 percent
of the FPL. Since Medi-Cal’s inception in 1966, two-parent families with chil-
dren have also been able to qualify for assistance based on their eligibility for
AFDC-UP, the pre-welfare reform program that provided cash assistance to
two-parent families when the principal wage earner was currently unemployed
but had a previous work history. Under TANF, Medicaid eligibility is now based
on the AFDC and AFDC-UP eligibility standards in effect on July 16, 1996.
Families whose incomes and resources exceed the gross income and
asset limits set for AFDC or AFDC-UP recipients but who would otherwise
qualify for these programs are eligible for Medi-Cal through the MN program.
However, they are required to spend down their income on medical care
expenses each month before Medicaid will cover them. Thus, Medi-Cal does
not assist with expenses until a family’s income after medical expenditures is
close to 100 percent of the FPL.
For families who have lost eligibility for welfare cash assistance because
of recent increases in earned income or child support payments, eligibility for
Medi-Cal may be retained through the continuing/transitional eligibility pro-
gram. This program extends eligibility for Medi-Cal for up to 12 months. A
second transitional eligibility program, called the Edward-Meyers program, is
unique to California and was created by court order. It provides persons with
Medi-Cal coverage until their family’s eligibility for Medi-Cal has been de-
termined. Families may remain on the Edward-Meyers program for months
and even years before exiting Medicaid completely or gaining eligibility
through another aid category.
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The last Medi-Cal eligible group included in this analysis is the MI
group. The MI program in California provides Medicaid benefits to low-
income persons under age 21 and adults over age 21 with a confirmed preg-
nancy. During the study period (1987–1995), most recipients included in the
MI program are persons also eligible under the Medicaid expansions of the
early 1980s and have incomes below 200 percent of the poverty level.1
The remaining Medi-Cal eligible groups include the aged, blind, and
disabled; persons eligible for emergency-only or pregnancy-only services; and
children living at up to 200 percent of the FPL. For this paper, I exclude the
aged, blind, and disabled because they face substantially different restrictions
on their eligibility for Medicaid services. Furthermore, their age and medical
conditions may limit their sensitivity to labor market opportunities and increase
their sensitivity to changes in the availability of health insurance. Children-only
cases are also excluded from this analysis because of the lack of data regarding
their parents. The vast majority of these cases were foster-care related.
DATA
Data from three sources are merged together by month and county. This unique
dataset contains several advantages over other sources of data on Medicaid
participation. First, the data come from administrative records. Other datasets
(e.g., the survey of income and program participation [SIPP]) rely on self-re-
ported health insurance status to identify persons on Medicaid and suffer from
significant under-reporting of Medicaid coverage, recall errors, and ‘‘seaming’’
biases (Lewis, Ellwood, and Czajka 1998). Second, no other data contain as
detailed information on the source of a person’s eligibility for Medicaid. With
this detail, I am able to analyze important difference in spell dynamics by
enrollment group. Third, though these data are only available through 1995, no
other database spans as many years and captures such significant variation in
labor market opportunities. This variation allows me to identify the effects of
local labor market conditions and structural changes on Medicaid participation.
Medicaid Participation
Data on Medicaid participation come from the California Work Pays Dem-
onstration Project: Statewide Longitudinal Database (LDB), 2 percent sample
(U.C. DATA 1996). The LDB comprises a 2 percent sample of cases enrolled
in California’s Medicaid program in January 1987 plus a 2 percent sample of
all new Medicaid cases starting each year from 1988 through 1995. The data
1766 HSR: Health Services Research 41:5 (October 2006)
are compiled from administrative records that contain monthly information
on enrollment in the Medicaid program.2
Within this sample all persons with the same case number were aggre-
gated into a single family-level record. I follow the Medicaid spell for the
mother in the family and, if no mother is present, the father. A Medicaid spell
was defined as a period of uninterrupted eligibility for full Medicaid benefits.
To adjust for administrative churning in eligibility, a family was only con-
sidered to have exited Medicaid if it was not recorded as eligible for two
continuous months.3 The final sample was obtained after dropping all left-
censored spells and a small number of cases with missing race data. After
sample selection, there were a total of 33,093 families with 49,300 spells and
1,021,461 person months.
Demographic and Benefit Characteristics
The LDB data also contain information on demographic factors and the spe-
cific type of cash assistance, if any, a recipient is receiving in addition to
Medicaid. Demographic variables include family structure (single mother,
single father, or two-parent family); age (15–19, 20–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64)
at the start of the spell; race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic
black, Hispanic, Filipino, Cambodian, Laotian, Vietnamese, other) of the
head of household; number of kids in the family; whether the mother is
pregnant during the Medicaid spell (yes/no); and age of the youngest child
(o0, 0–2, 3–5, 6–21) at the start of the spell.4
LDB data also provided additional information on the benefit charac-
teristics of an individual’s Medicaid spell. Additional spell characteristics con-
trolled for in the model included (1) whether the recipient had a previous
Medicaid spell; (2) whether the modal aid code associated with the recipient’s
current Medicaid spell was based on eligibility for AFDC, AFDC-UP, Ed-
ward-Meyers, Continuing Medi-Cal, the MI Program, or the MN program; (3)
whether the Medi-Cal recipient had ever received a cash grant; (4) whether the
recipient had ever received Medi-Cal only; (5) whether the recipient ever had
to pay a share of cost; (6) whether the recipient had ever been classified as an
AFDC-UP participant in a two-parent family; and (7) whether the recipient
ever qualified as an immigrant/refugee case.5
Labor Market Conditions
Data on labor market characteristics were obtained from the California Em-
ployment Development Department (EDD 1997). Four key measures of labor
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market conditions were used in this analysis: unemployment rate, employ-
ment to population ratio, level of employment (total and by one-digit Standard
Industry Code [SIC] sector), and average quarterly earnings deflated to 1987
(total and by sector). For all but a few small counties in northern California,
labor market conditions were measured at the county level. Small counties
were grouped to protect the confidentiality of Medicaid recipients sampled for
the LDB. After grouping the small counties, the data covered 41 labor market
regions in California.
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
No direct measures of health insurance status in California were available at
the county level. Therefore, I created an index on the availability of employer-
sponsored health insurance to the working poor (i.e., employed persons living
below 200 percent of the FPL).6 The index is calculated using statewide health
insurance data from the 1988 to 1996 March Supplements of the Current
Population Survey (CPS), industry-level poverty-weights from the CPS, and
industry and firm size weights provided by EDD.
Using the California subsample of the CPS, I estimated the percent of
civilian workers age 15 or older covered by health insurance through their
own employer by one-digit SIC industry groups (Hi) and the percent of these
workers living below 200 percent of the FPL (Pi).
7 Multiplying the percent
insured in each industry (Hi) with the percent working poor in each industry
(Pi) and the number employed in each industry by county (Eic), I obtain an
estimate of the number of working poor with insurance in each industry within
each county. Summing over all industries in the county and dividing by the
number of working poor in the county yields an estimate of the fraction of
working poor in the county insured through their own employer (FPHc).
8
In the absence of data to directly calculate insurance rates by county
from the CPS, this measure provides a good instrument for the probability that
former Medi-Cal recipients in the county will be able to obtain employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage if they work. It takes into account both
yearly variations in state insurance rates, variations in insurance rates by
industry, and variations over time and between counties in employment. The
measure captures both the probabilities that an employer offers coverage and
that an employee accepts the offer.9 Because those leaving Medicaid will most
likely be employed in low-wage jobs (Short, Cantor, and Monheit 1988), it also
captures variation between industries in the composition of employment by
poverty status.
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METHODS
The determinants of exits from Medicaid are estimated using a discrete time
hazard model where the hazard rate is modeled as a logit probability (Lan-
caster 1992; Allison 1984). This specification easily incorporates nonmono-
tonic duration dependence and time-varying covariates. The hazard rate
captures the probability of an exit in the tth month given continuous program
participation for the last t 1 months and a vector of covariates. The primary
covariates of interest are labor market conditions and employer-sponsored
health insurance rates. In addition, I control for demographic characteristics
and characteristics of the Medicaid benefits received. I also include dummy
variables to account for the basic duration properties in the model.10
The discrete duration model is estimated using conventional maximum
likelihood methods where the likelihood is a function of both the survival
function and the duration distribution. Right-censored spells contribute to the
estimation of the hazard until the month they are censored. Left-censored
spells are dropped from the analysis because the inception time for left-cen-
sored spell is unknown and it is impossible to control for duration dependence
in these spells.11 To allow for the fact that observations (i.e., person months)
from the same case are not independent, robust standard errors are calculated.
To control for omitted area characteristics (e.g., average educational level), I
include fixed area effects.12 To control for omitted time trends (e.g., part-time
employment rates), I include fixed year effects. With both these fixed effects
included, the model is identified by within county variation over time that is
different from the overall time trends in employment growth, wage growth,
and insurance coverage in the state.
Although county and year fixed effects control for omitted area char-
acteristics and time trends, some important limitations remain. First, in some
cases the relevant labor market area may be larger or smaller than the county.
Although subcounty data were not available, I tested for broader labor market
effects by grouping neighboring counties into metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA) and computing all labor market variables at the MSA level. The results
did not change substantially. Second, a small percent of families move be-
tween counties during a spell. If the moves are correlated with labor market
conditions (e.g., families move to an area with better labor market conditions
before exiting Medicaid) then my estimates will be upwardly biased. To test
for this, I estimated the effects of labor market conditions holding the county of
residence constant throughout the spell. As before, the results did not change
substantially. Third, the composition of Medicaid caseloads may change as the
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economy moves from a period of economic expansion to a period of eco-
nomic contraction. The cohort entering the program during an economic
contraction is likely to have better work experience and higher education than
the cohort entering during an economic expansion. The presence of a cohort
effect would bias the results toward zero. Although I do find evidence of a




Demographic Characteristics of Medicaid Recipients. Approximately 34 percent of
the 49,300 spells observed between 1987 and 1995 were right-censored. And
75 percent of the observed spells were to new recipients (i.e., recipients who
had no record of a previous spells on Medicaid between 1987 and 1995). In
the majority of spells, the head of household was a white (41 percent), single
mother (72 percent) aged 20–34 (60 percent) with one child (mean number of
kids was 1.6) between the ages of 0 and 2 (51 percent). Eight percent of the
Medicaid spells were attributable to an immigrant family. The mean modal
aid code for 49 percent of spells was AFDC. But eligibility for Medicaid via
the AFDC-UP (11 percent), MI (10 percent), and MN (23 percent) programs
was also common.
Movements between aid codes during a spell occurred frequently. Of
those who began a Medicaid spell on AFDC or AFDC-UP, 34 and 31 percent,
respectively, ended the spell on the Edward-Meyers program. In many cases,
the Edward-Meyers program substituted for the continuing Medi-Cal
program in extending Medi-Cal benefits after the loss of eligibility for cash
assistance. However, most families (56 percent of AFDC-related spells and 46
percent of AFDC-UP related spells) did not continue to receive Medicaid
benefits after losing cash assistance.13
Labor Market Conditions and Private Health Insurance. During the study period,
the average unemployment rate was 8.6 percent; average quarterly earnings
were $5,343 dollars (1987 dollars); and 51 percent of civilian workers in
California were insured through their own employer. The average insurance
rate was lower (44 percent) for those living below 200 percent of the FPL.
These means, however, mask significant variation in California’s labor
market conditions over time and across counties. Between 1987 and 1990
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California experienced a period of economic expansion followed by a period
of economic contraction from 1991 to 1995. As a result, unemployment rates
varied from a low of 2.2 percent in more urban areas in the state (e.g.,
Alameda county) to a high of 38 percent in more rural areas (e.g., Fresno).
Likewise, average quarterly earnings and the availability of employer-
provided insurance varied significantly over time and across labor market
regions. In rural areas, average quarterly earnings were as low as $3,293 and
the poverty-weighted health insurance rate (estimated as described above)
was as low as 30 percent during periods of economic contraction. In urban
areas, average quarterly earnings reached $8,067 and poverty-weighted
employer-provided health insurance rates were as high as 57 percent during
periods of economic expansion.
During the study period, there was also significant variation in
employment and average quarterly earnings by industry. Between January
1987 and January 1996, employment in the service sector increased 5
percent. At the same time, employment in manufacturing decreased by
almost 4 percent. Average earnings for jobs in retail, nonprofessional
services, and agriculture——sectors that are likely to employ Medicaid
recipients——were significantly lower ($4,106, $3,077, and $3,913
respectively) than average quarterly earnings in all industries ($5,343).
Finally, data from the CPS show that employer-sponsored health
insurance was most common in industries with a stable work force, such as
public administration (80 percent in 1991), and industries whose workers
were generally in collective bargaining arrangements, such as manufacturing
(73 percent in 1991), and transportation, communication, and utilities (71
percent in 1991). Employers in the agricultural, service, and retail sectors
were among the least likely to provide health insurance benefits to their
employees. In 1991, health insurance rates in agriculture, retail, and services
were 25, 34, and 31 percent, respectively.13
Multivariate
Effects of Demographic Characteristics. The modal Medicaid recipient is
receiving welfare cash assistance and is a white single mother between 20
and 34 years old with one child ages 0–2. For this baseline case, the median
spell length is 19 months and the probability of leaving Medicaid within 2
years is 54 percent (Table 1). Teenage parents (ages 15–19) and mothers older
than 45 tend to stay on Medicaid longer than mothers between the ages of 20
and 34. Pregnant women and East Asian refugees (e.g., Vietnamese) had the
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longest spells. By contrast, persons who have historically had greater labor
market opportunities (e.g., single fathers, parents between the ages of 20 and
34, and whites) had relatively short Medicaid spells.
Effects of Benefit Type and Level. In addition to varying across demographic
groups, Medicaid dynamics vary significantly by modal eligibility group and
benefit level (Table 1). In contrast to single mothers on AFDC, two-parent
Table 1: Predicted Effects of Family and Benefit Characteristics on Medi-
Cal Exit Ratesn
Probability That a Completed Spell Lasts
Predicted
Median 6 mo.  1 yr  2 yrs.  4 yrs.  8 yrs.
Basew 0.135 0.316 0.541 0.639 0.776 19
Single dad 0.151 0.349 0.585 0.683 0.815 17
Two parent on AFDC-UPz 0.149 0.344 0.578 0.676 0.809 18
Had past spell 0.146 0.338 0.570 0.669 0.803 18
Teen head (ages 15–19) 0.113 0.270 0.475 0.570 0.710 27
Head 35–44 0.120 0.284 0.496 0.592 0.731 24
Head 45–54 0.100 0.241 0.431 0.522 0.662 35
Head 55–64 0.099 0.240 0.430 0.520 0.660 36
Hispanic 0.130 0.306 0.526 0.624 0.762 20
Black 0.131 0.309 0.530 0.628 0.766 20
Vietnamese 0.061 0.153 0.288 0.358 0.478 100
Number kids 5 2 0.126 0.298 0.516 0.613 0.752 22
Pregnant in spell 0.070 0.174 0.325 0.401 0.529 92
Youngesto0 0.238 0.507 0.765 0.850 0.938 12
Youngest child 3–5 0.142 0.331 0.561 0.659 0.794 18
Youngest child 6–21 0.143 0.334 0.564 0.663 0.797 18
Edward-Meyersz 0.281 0.575 0.827 0.899 0.966 10
Continuing Medi-Calz 0.292 0.591 0.840 0.909 0.971 10
Medically indigentz 0.271 0.560 0.814 0.889 0.961 11
Medically Needyz 0.164 0.374 0.616 0.714 0.841 17
Ever Medi-Cal only 0.345 0.665 0.894 0.947 0.987 8
Ever Medi-Cal w/cost 0.256 0.537 0.794 0.873 0.952 11
Ever immigrant 0.137 0.320 0.546 0.644 0.781 19
Ever AFDC-UP 0.139 0.325 0.552 0.651 0.787 19
nPredicted effects are calculated from logit models including duration dummies, county fixed
effects, and year fixed effects (see Table 7, model 3 in Appendix 1 for a detailed specification).
wThe baseline case is a white, single mother age 20–34 receiving welfare (i.e., AFDC) and with one
child age 0–2.
zThe eligibility category through which a Medi-Cal recipient qualifies may change during a spell.
mo., months; yr, year; AFDC-UP, aid for families with dependent children-unemployed parent.
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families on AFDC-UP will have a median spell lasting approximately 18
months rather than 19. Those whose modal eligibility is through the Edward-
Meyers program or the continuing Medi-Cal programs have the shortest
median spell length of 10 months. Finally, those who have qualified for Medi-
Cal only and those who have had to pay a share of cost are more likely to exit
the program and have shorter spells.
Effects of Local Labor Market Conditions. Whether evaluated using un-
employment rates, employment-to-population ratios, or employment
levels, I find that improvements in employment opportunities significantly
increase movements off the Medicaid program (Table 2). The data presented
in Table 2 indicate the percent change (relative to the baseline specification)
in the probability of exiting Medicaid given a one standard deviation change
in each labor market variable. Evaluated at the mean, a decrease of 3.7
percentage points (43 percent) in the unemployment rate led to a 5-month
decrease (16.66 percent) in median spell length (panel A). A 4.5 percentage
point (10 percent) increase in the employment-to-population ratio (panel B)
reduced the median spell length by approximately 2 months (6.66 percent).
Using the log of employment as a measure of job availability (panel C), I
found that a 10 percent increase in employment was associated with a 3-
month (10 percent) reduction in the median spell length. The elasticities
(%DY/%DX ) implied by these percentage changes are 0.39 for
unemployment, 0.67 for the employment-to-population ratio, and 1.00 for
employment growth. Thus, exit rates tend to be slightly more responsive to
changes in employment growth than to changes in the employment-to-
population ratio or to unemployment rates. Regardless of the measure of
employment opportunities used, a 10 percent increase in average earnings
decreased median spell length by 3–4 months (10–13 percent). Results on the
effects of employment growth and earnings did vary significantly by industry
(see Appendix 1 online). In general, Medicaid exit rates were most responsive
to employment and earnings growth in the retail sector.
Effects of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance. The probability of exiting
Medicaid clearly increased with improvements in the availability of
employer-sponsored health insurance benefits for the working poor (panel
D). A 5 percent increase (2.5 percentage points) in insurance rates was
associated with a 13 percent decrease (4 months) in median spell length for
the baseline case.14 Given the implied elasticity (2.60), Medicaid spells are
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more responsive to employer-provided health insurance rates than to any
other aspect of the local labor market.
The total combined effect of changes in labor market conditions is quite
large (panel D). As the economy moves from a recession to a period of
economic expansion, the median Medicaid spell will decrease by a full year
(12 months). As spell lengths decline so will Medicaid caseloads and
expenditures. In other words, caseloads and expenditures will be sensitive to
changes over time in labor market conditions and the quality of jobs (i.e.,
earnings and the availability of employer-sponsored insurance). In addition,
changes in the composition of the labor force that increase the rate of employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage and the availability of jobs in sectors
most likely to employ persons living near or below poverty will result in
significant declines in Medicaid caseloads and expenditures.15
Table 2: Predicted Effects of Changes in Labor and Health Insurance
Markets on Medi-Cal Exit Ratesn
Predicted Median
% Change in Probability That a Spell Lasts
Spell Length w  6 mo.  1 yr  2 yrs.  4 yrs.  8 yrs.
(A) Model 1: unemployment rate
Unemployment rate  0.037 25 11.48 10.29 8.60 7.70 6.14
Earnings110% 27 8.75 7.86 6.60 5.93 4.75
(B) Model 2: employment-to-population ratio
Employment/population10.045 28 6.86 6.17 5.20 4.67 3.75
Earnings110% 26 9.92 8.91 7.46 6.69 5.34
(C) Model 3: employment growth
Employment110% 27 9.10 8.17 6.86 6.15 4.93
Earnings110% 26 10.66 9.56 8.01 7.17 5.73
(D) Model 4: poverty weighted health insurance rate
Unemployment rate  0.037 24 17.03 15.18 12.58 11.20 8.84
Earnings110% 27 8.18 7.36 6.18 5.55 4.45
Insurance rate10.025 26 11.19 10.04 8.40 7.52 5.99
Combined changes 18 40.28 35.09 28.04 24.45 18.52
nEach panel (A–D) reflects calculations from a separate model. All models include the control
variables listed in Table 1, duration dummies, county fixed effects, and time fixed effects.
Models 1–3 use three different measures of labor market conditions. In model 4, the poverty
weighted health insurance rate is added to model 1. All simulations are calculated for the baseline
case——a white, single mother ages 20–34 with one child age 0–2 and enrolled in AFDC.
Labor market variables are set to their mean values.
wThe predicted median spell length for the baseline case is 30 months.
mo., months; yr, year; AFDC, aid for families with dependent children.
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Labor Market Effects by Benefit Group. To allow for individual heterogeneity
among the populations being served by Medicaid, we reestimate our final
model (model 4, Table 2) by benefit group. Models 2 through 4 of Table 3
show labor market effects for groups with different modal aid codes. AFDC-
UP families are significantly more sensitive to all labor market conditions
than AFDC families. These results are not surprising because AFDC-UP
families contain two potential earners who typically have more substantial
labor market experience and higher potential wages than single-parent
recipients (Hoynes 1996).
Persons enrolled through the MN program are less sensitive to labor
market opportunities and changes in health insurance rates than those on
AFDC. Again, these results are sensible. The MN have higher incomes and
assets than persons on AFDC, and only a proximate need for health insurance
has sent them to the Medicaid program. Moreover, for those seeking to exit
the Medicaid program, private health insurers would consider the illness a
preexisting condition. Thus, even when health insurance is available more
generally, it may not be available to those exiting the MN program.
Models 5 through 7 of Table 3 show only one significant difference
between Medicaid enrollees with different levels of benefit. Persons who have
received Medicaid only or have been required to pay a share of costs are less
sensitive to earnings growth than those receiving a cash grant in addition to
Medicaid.
DISCUSSION
Over the last two decades employer-sponsored insurance coverage has
eroded, leaving an increasing number of persons dependent on the
public health insurance system or without any health insurance at all (Strunk
and Reschovsky 2004). In this analysis, I study the effects of changes in the
availability of employer-sponsored health insurance on Medicaid participa-
tion. I find that those receiving Medicaid benefits are highly sensitive to the
availability of employer-sponsored health insurance and other local labor
market conditions. A 3.7 percentage-point decrease in unemployment
rates, together with a 10 percent increase in earnings and a 2.5 percent
rate increase in employer-sponsored insurance coverage, decreases the me-
dian spell length by up to 40 percent (approximately 1 year). All else equal,
shorter Medicaid spells will lead to smaller caseloads and lower Medicaid
expenditures.
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Not only will the magnitude of local labor market growth affect Med-
icaid participation but also the composition of local labor market growth will
affect the dynamics of Medicaid enrollment. Employment growth in the serv-
ice and retail sectors, where the poor and near-poor are likely to find em-
ployment, will have a greater influence on Medicaid exits than growth in other
sectors. At the same time, however, persons leaving Medicaid with jobs in
these sectors will be less likely to obtain insurance coverage through their
employer. Thus, the positive effect on exit rates of employment growth in









Model 1: full sample 1,021,428  4.164nn 0.159nn 0.046nn
(0.520) (0.023) (0.008)
12.6% 6.2% 8.4%
Model 2: modal AFDC cases 652,357  5.509nn 0.367nn 0.069nn
(0.799) (0.034) (0.012)
14.1% 13.5% 12.0%
Model 3: modal AFDC-UP cases 144,185  4.242nn 0.598nn 0.036
(1.610) (0.074) (0.026)
9.8% 20.0% 5.6%
Model 4: modal Medically Needy cases 165,761  4.759nn  0.070 0.019
(0.879) (0.042) (0.014)
13.1%  2.7% 3.5%
Model 5: cases ever on Medi-Cal
with cash grant
856,926  5.177nn 0.383nn 0.052nn
(0.680) (0.029) (0.011)
12.3% 13.2% 8.4%
Model 6: cases ever on Medi-Cal only 663,192  5.384nn 0.069n 0.055nn
(0.646) (0.028) (0.010)
14.9% 2.7% 10.1%
Model 7: cases ever on Medi-Cal
with share of cost
138,082  4.161nn  0.154n 0.019
(1.091) (0.056) (0.018)
9.9%  5.2% 3.1%
npo.05.
nnpo.01.
wAll models are estimated using logits that include the control variables listed in Table 1, duration
dummies, county fixed effects, and time fixed effects. Estimated coefficients from the logit models
are presented first. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The numbers in italics are the predicted percentage changes in the probability that a completed
spell lasts  2 years for a 3.7 percentage point decrease in unemployment, a 10 percent increase
in earnings, or a 2.5 percentage point increase in the poverty-weighted health insurance rate.
The percentage change is calculated for the baseline case——a white, single mother ages 20–34 with
one child age 0–2——with labor market variables initially set to their mean values.
For models 5–7, the modal case is set to AFDC.
AFDC-UP, aid for families with dependent children-unemployed parent.
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these industries may be reduced by the lack of health insurance coverage
available through them.
This analysis also finds significant differences between demographic
groups in their responsiveness to local labor market conditions. Participants
with greater labor force attachment and less freedom to migrate to counties
with better labor market conditions will be more sensitive to changes in em-
ployment, earnings, and health insurance coverage. On the other hand, those
with preexisting medical conditions that may limit their access to private
health insurance will be less sensitive to growth in employer-sponsored cov-
erage, even when the employment outlook appears good.
Although there are variations in their responsiveness, persons on Medicaid
do respond to economic incentives and dependency on public assistance reflects
a lack of opportunities for those seeking self-sufficiency. As employment, wages,
and the availability of employer-sponsored health insurance grow, individuals
will exit the Medicaid program and take advantage of opportunities to enroll in
private-sector insurance programs. Those most likely to do so are among the
working poor who want to avoid the stigma and routine hassles associated with
receiving any form of public assistance (Levinson and Rahardja 2004).
These results highlight one of the major problems associated with the
devolution of public assistance programs to the states (and counties)——the lack
of countercyclical public financing. Demand for Medicaid will tend to increase
during periods of economic contraction——a time when states find their tax
revenues declining. Federal funding allows states to share the economic risk of
public programs and to take advantage of geographic differences in economic
conditions. With more limited federal funding for Medicaid in addition to
other publicly funded programs (e.g., education and welfare), states will find it
increasingly difficult to balance their budgets during economic downturns. As
the fastest growing share of state budgets, Medicaid may be a primary target
for cuts (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004c).
Overall, these results show that just as expansions in Medicaid crowd out
employer-sponsored coverage, contractions in employer-sponsored coverage
crowd in Medicaid participation. Therefore, improvements in employer-pro-
vided health insurance programs, especially coverage for the working poor,
can help to decrease the demand for Medicaid. In the absence of compre-
hensive health care reform, improving health insurance coverage in America
will require a sustained attack on both fronts. Initiatives to expand eligibility
for Medicaid and increase the take-up of Medicaid benefits should be
combined with initiatives to improve the availability and affordability of
health insurance through the workplace and individual insurance markets. By
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creating better transitions between the public and private insurance system,
policymakers can help to support welfare to work transitions and promote the
health and well-being of America’s working poor families.
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NOTES
1. A review of the administrative data used in this study showed that the Medicaid
expansion aid categories for pregnant women and children were never assigned
during the time period under study. Instead, eligibility workers in California con-
tinued to assign pregnant women and children to the medically indigent program.
2. Although the LDB allows researchers to follow many persons for a long time, like
other administrative datasets, it also has significant limitations. The LDB cannot be
used to evaluate program participation and cannot be used to measure outcomes,
such as indicators of well-being, which are not tracked by the Medi-Cal admin-
istration. Moreover, only a limited number of demographic control variables are
available and, once they leave the program, no data on program participants are
available. For a comprehensive discussion of the benefits and limitations of ad-
ministrative data in policy-relevant research, see Hotz et al. (2006).
3. Administrative ‘‘churning’’ occurs whenever recipients appear to cycle on-and-off
aid because of administrative problems without actually going ‘‘off’’ aid. Brady and
Luks (1995) analyzed churning in the LDB and found that administrative breaks
are typically 2–3 months among AFDC recipients.
4. In two-parent families, the race and age of the health of household were set equal to
the father’s characteristics. If data on the father were missing, the mother’s age and
race were used. When a woman is pregnant in the spell and the youngest child is
o0, this implies that the woman has no other living children.
5. Immigrant families included refugee cash assistance recipients, IRCA aliens, and
OBRA aliens.
6. The 200 percent FPL weight was chosen to reflect the upper income limit for
pregnant women and the medically needy who must spend-down their income to
become eligible for medical assistance from the Medi-Cal program.
1778 HSR: Health Services Research 41:5 (October 2006)
7. Several changes were introduced in the 1995 CPS (Swartz 1997). Therefore, health
insurance estimates for 1994 and 1995 may not be comparable to estimates from
earlier years.
8. The formula for the fraction of working-poor with employer-sponsored health
insurance is FPHc 5
SðHiPiEic Þ
SðPiEic Þ .
9. Employees may choose not to accept coverage if they have another source of
coverage, if the cost of the employee’s share of premiums is high, or if they do not
expect to need medical services. Thus, our data may underestimate the probability
that coverage is offered.
10. In all models, the duration dummies are estimated for 2-month intervals over the
first 24 months, two 3-month intervals and one 6-month interval over the third
year, 12-month intervals for the next 4 years, and two 3-month intervals followed
by 2-month intervals for the remaining study period. Medicaid exit rates peaked
between the 8th and 14th months of a spell and gradually decline thereafter. They
were jointly significant at the 1-percent level and individually significant up
through the 7th year.
11. Left-censored spells tend to over represent long spells. If people with long spells are
less sensitive to labor market conditions, dropping these spells will likely lead to an
upward bias in the labor market effects.
12. Because there are few individual-level variables in the LDB, omitted individual
characteristics may be particularly problematic. Research by Hoynes (2000), how-
ever suggests that the inclusion of county-fixed effects control for aggregate indi-
vidual characteristics (e.g., average education level) fairly well.
13. More descriptive information on the demographic characteristics of persons in our
sample and Kaplan–Meir estimates of failure rates and median spell length for each
characteristic are available on-line in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also provides ad-
ditional detail regarding labor market conditions in California.
14. Results may be upwardly biased if the health insurance effect captures other as-
pects of job quality that are not reflected in differences in wage growth across
counties or time trends.
15. Models (not shown) without year fixed effects were also estimated. When year
fixed effects are not included the estimated effects of labor market conditions on
Medicaid exists are two to four times larger than the effects shown here.
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